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INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE1
Amici are law professors who specialize in
intellectual property law and who have previously
published on, or have interest in, the issue of
extraterritoriality. Amici have no personal stake in
the outcome of this case but have an interest in seeing
that the patent laws develop in a way that promotes
rather than impedes innovation. A complete list of
amici is included in Appendix A.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case presents an issue of importance that
transcends patent law: whether the presumption
against the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws
applies separately to the remedial provisions of a
statute. Here, the issue arises in the context of
damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284 of the Patent Act that
arise from infringement under an expressly
extraterritorial provision, 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).
The Supreme Court should first conclude that the
presumption does apply to remedial provisions. That
1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici curiae affirm
that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part,
that no counsel or a party made a monetary contribution
intended to the preparation or submission of this brief and no
person other than amici curiae, their members, or their counsels
made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.

Both Petitioner and Respondent filed blanket consent to the
filing of amicus curiae briefs, both of which are on file with the
clerk.
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conclusion should not end the inquiry, however. The
Court should require a formal consideration of comity
and potential conflicts with foreign law before
allowing an award of damages arising outside of the
United States. Additionally, the presumption against
extraterritoriality should be considered as part of the
proximate cause analysis when determining whether
the asserted damages are appropriate.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE
PRESUMPTION
AGAINST
EXTRATERRITORIALITY SHOULD APPLY TO
REMEDIAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS.
A. The Supreme Court Has Emphasized the
Importance of the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, Particularly in the
Context of Patent Law.
The Supreme Court has established that there is a
strong presumption against the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law. See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v.

European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101, 2106 (2016)

(finding presumption rebutted for § 1962 of Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act but not
§ 1964(c)); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569
U.S. 108, 124 (2013) (relying on presumption to
decline to extend reach of Alien Tort Statute);
Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247,
265 (2010) (relying on presumption to decline
application of United States securities law to foreign
conduct); E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244, 259 (1991) (using presumption to decline
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application of Title VII to employment practices of
U.S. employers employing U.S. citizens abroad).
Although Congress undisputedly has the authority to
regulate acts outside of the territorial boundaries of
the United States, the Court has recognized that
“legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States . . . .” Foley Bros. v.
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
The Court has noted that the presumption is
particularly appropriate in the context of patent law.
See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 45455 (2007) (“The presumption that United States law
governs domestically but does not rule the world
applies with particular force in patent law.”). As far
back as 1856, this Court rejected the extraterritorial
reach of a patent: “The power thus granted is domestic
in its character, and necessarily confined within the
limits of the United States.” Brown v. Duchesne, 60
U.S. 183, 195 (1856) (holding U.S. patent rights do not
extend to invention on foreign vessel in U.S. port).
More recently, this Court again rejected a party’s
attempt to use its patent to control extraterritorial
activity. In Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,
the Supreme Court concluded that the manufacture of
all components of a patented invention in the United
States, that subsequently was assembled abroad, did
not constitute infringement of a U.S. patent. 406 U.S.
518, 529 (1972). The Court emphasized that “[o]ur
patent system makes no claim to extraterritorial
effect.” Id. at 531.
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Congress
legislatively
overturned
the
extraterritorial aspect of Deepsouth by adopting 35
U.S.C. § 271(f) in 1984. Section 271(f), the statutory
provision at issue in this case, focuses on acts of
exportation to foreign markets. The provision defines
two forms of infringement. The first directly relates
to the specific fact pattern in Deepsouth:
Whoever without authority supplies or causes
to be supplied in or from the United States all
or a substantial portion of the components of
a patented invention, where such components
are uncombined in whole or in part, in such
manner as to actively induce the combination
of such components outside of the United
States in a manner that would infringe the
patent if such combination occurred within
the United States, shall be liable as an
infringer.
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1). Second, Congress went beyond
the facts of Deepsouth to afford patent owners
additional protections from the exportation of
components with no non-infringing substitutes:
Whoever without authority supplies or causes
to be supplied in or from the United States
any component of a patented invention that is
especially made or especially adapted for use
in the invention and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use, where such
component is uncombined in whole or in part,
knowing that such component is so made or
adapted and intending that such component
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will be combined outside of the United States
in a manner that would infringe the patent if
such combination occurred within the United
States, shall be liable as an infringer.
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2).
This Court has relied on the presumption against
extraterritoriality to construe that provision
narrowly. In Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., the Court
held that (1) only computer software, not software in
the abstract, could constitute a “component” under
§ 271(f), 550 U.S. 437, 449-50 (2007), and (2) such
components were not “supplied” under § 271(f) when
copies of the software were made outside of the United
States. Id. at 452-54. To support this interpretation,
the Court specifically noted that “[a]ny doubt that
Microsoft’s conduct falls outside § 271(f)’s compass
would be resolved by the presumption against
extraterritoriality . . . .” Id. at 454. Notwithstanding
that Congress explicitly abrogated Deepsouth as it
relates to exports to afford some extraterritorial
protection to U.S. patent holders, the Court rejected
AT&T’s argument that the presumption was
inapplicable and used the presumption to construe
§ 271(f) narrowly. Id. at 454-56. See generally
Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S.
Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2119, 2135-36
(2008) [hereinafter Extraterritoriality] (discussing
importance of the use of the presumption in
Microsoft).
The Supreme Court’s explication of the
presumption culminated in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v.
European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016), where
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the Court articulated a two-step framework for
addressing whether a statute has extraterritorial
reach. First, a court must determine whether the
statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that it
applies extraterritorially, thereby rebutting the
presumption against it. Id. at 2101. Satisfying step
one is sufficient to end the inquiry, and a court need
only proceed to step two if step one is not met. Id.
If the statute does not clearly have extraterritorial
reach, step two requires a court to look at the location
of the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus. Id. The
statute’s application is domestic (and therefore within
the court’s jurisdiction) when the conduct relevant to
the statute’s focus occurred in the United States, even
if other conduct occurred abroad. Id. The statute’s
application is extraterritorial and thus impermissible
when conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a
foreign country regardless of any other conduct that
occurred in the United States. Id.
B. The Supreme Court Has Never Expressly
Held Whether the Presumption Applies
Separately to Remedial Provisions After a
Determination of Liability Has Been Made.
In all of the cases in which the Court has addressed
the presumption against extraterritoriality, it has
confronted an issue of liability: whether activities
outside of the United States could nevertheless create
liability within the United States.
This case is different. The issue is the availability
of damages for activities arising outside the territorial
United States.
This Court has never squarely

7
addressed whether the presumption applies to
remedial provisions. This Court has intimated that
the presumption applies at all levels of a statutory
scheme. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106
(rejecting Second Circuit’s holding that “the
presumption against extraterritoriality did not apply
to § 1964(c) independently of its application to
§ 1962”); see also Maggie Gardner, RJR Nabisco and
the Runaway Canon, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 134, 139
(2016) (“[T]he Court announced a new requirement
that the presumption be applied separately to every
statutory provision, whether substantive, remedial, or
jurisdictional.”). Indeed, in RJR Nabisco, a four
justice majority of the Court applied the presumption
separately to different provisions of the statute,
suggesting that the presumption would separately
apply to remedial provisions of a statute. See Sapna
Kumar, Patent Damages Without Borders, 25 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 73, 103 (2017).
To address the question presented in this case, the
Court must necessarily answer this question. Here,
liability has been established under § 271(f). The only
issue is the appropriate scope of damages permitted
under 35 U.S.C. § 284, the damages provision of the
Patent Act. That provision notes that “the court shall
award the claimant damages adequate to compensate
for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention
by the infringer.” 35 U.S.C. § 284. Although § 284
does not note any territorial limitations itself, it does
reference acts of infringement, which are defined by
35 U.S.C. § 271. Answering whether the presumption
applies to § 284, therefore, is a necessary prerequisite
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to determining whether damages should be available
in this case.
C. The
Presumption
Against
Extraterritoriality Should Apply Separately
to Remedial Statutory Provisions.
The presumption against extraterritoriality
should apply both in the liability and the remedies
contexts. The line between liability and damages is
gossamer thin. The question of whether one is liable
for extraterritorial conduct leads to the same place—
that is, the determination of the extraterritorial reach
of a U.S. patent right. From an extraterritorial
perspective, a determination of liability or an award
of damages both attempt to regulate conduct outside
of the United States. Only applying a “one pass” rule
for the presumption, as argued by both the Petitioner,
see Brief for Petitioner at 46 (filed Feb. 23, 2018), and
the United States, see Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 14 (filed Dec. 6, 2017), would
impermissibly permit certain damages arising from
foreign activity and inappropriately extend the reach
of United States patent law outside the territorial
limits established in the Microsoft case.
The precursors to the present case show the
danger in failing to apply the presumption separately
to damages. For example, in Power Integrations v. v.
Fairchild Semiconductor, 711 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir.
2013), the Federal Circuit confronted a scenario
where there was an act of domestic infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), which is limited to acts
“within the United States.” Id. at 1348. The patentee,
however, sought damages for the lost profits for its
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foregone sales outside of the United States that arose
as a result of the domestic act of infringement. Id.
The Federal Circuit rejected the damages theory
based on a strict territorial rule regarding patent
damages. If the presumption did not apply to
remedies, however, then there would have been an
odd result: the statute would have failed both steps
one and two of the RJR Nabisco test because the
statute is clearly territorial and the focus of the
statute is infringing acts within the United States.
Indeed, it is conceivable that a court would never have
thought to consider the presumption at the liability
phase. Yet, any and all damages that possibly could
flow from those domestic acts would be permissible,
regardless of where the acts triggering those damages
arose. Effectively, the patentee would be using its
United States patent to regulate those foreign sales.
Subsequent to Power Integrations, the Federal
Circuit encountered a similar scenario, with the
patentee seeking a reasonable royalty as damages
under 35 U.S.C. § 284. In Carnegie Mellon University
v. Marvell Technology Group, Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283
(Fed. Cir. 2015), there was a domestic use of the
patented invention; the patentee, however, sought a
reasonable royalty for the defendant’s sales made
overseas. Id. at 1305. The Federal Circuit, relying on
Power Integrations, rejected such damages. Id. at
1310-11.
A failure to apply the presumption
separately to both liability and damages would result
in allowing the patentee, through the use of
reasonable royalties, to attempt to regulate foreign
activities.
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These cases demonstrate that a liability versus
remedies line is a distinction without a difference.
The acts that generated the damages sought by the
patentee could also have triggered liability in the
relevant countries where their foreign acts occurred.
Whether these are viewed as now-past acts that
trigger liability (upon which damages could be based)
or seen as a pure damages issue is irrelevant to the
policies that underlie the presumption, including
concerns of comity and interference with the
sovereignty of another country.
Holbrook,
Extraterritoriality, supra, at 2126-27 (2008); Amy
Landers, U.S. Patent Extraterritoriality Within the
International Context, 36 REV. LITIG. BRIEF 28, 28-29
(2016).
II. APPLICATION OF THE PRESUMPTION IN
THIS CASE WOULD STILL PERMIT AN AWARD
OF DAMAGES.
Application of the RJR Nabisco framework in this
case would permit an award of damages in this case
under § 271(f). This contrasts significantly with how
the presumption would apply to infringement under
§ 271(a), as was the case in Power Integrations and

Carnegie Mellon.

Section 284 is textually silent as to its territorial
limits. Instead, it references “damages adequate to
compensate for the infringement,” thus incorporating
the acts in the separate subsections of § 271. While
§ 284 is meant to be compensatory in nature, see Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 655
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(1983),2 such focus does not mandate that territorial
limits be ignored. That finding would fly in the face of
the presumption against territoriality. Instead, a
court should look at the relevant infringement
provision to assess the territorial limits of damages for
that provision. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Boundaries,

Extraterritoriality,
and
Patent
Infringement
Damages, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1745, 1777-78

(2017).
The various infringement provisions of § 271 differ
significantly in their scope and purpose. As such, it
would be inappropriate to treat all of them collectively
under the presumption, as the Federal Circuit has
apparently done, for purposes of assessing the
appropriate territorial limit on patent damages. Id.
at 1778. Application of step one of RJR Nabisco,
therefore, leads to different outcomes as to the
availability of damages under § 284 for infringement
under § 271(a) and § 271(f).
Section 271(a) has strict territorial limits, limiting
liability to acts “within the United States” or
importation “into the United States.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a). With its strict territorial language, step one
of RJR Nabisco would not be satisfied. There is no
intent on the part of Congress to embrace foreign
activity under § 271(a). In all likelihood, damages
arising from infringement under § 271(a) would likely
fail step two as well. Analysis of step two in isolation,
The Court was not addressing the full scope of damages
permissible in General Motors; instead, the narrow issue before
it was “the standard applicable to the award of prejudgment
interest under 35 U.S.C. § 284.”Gen. Motors, 461 U.S at 651.
2
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without the particular facts of the case, is difficult. In
the main, however, we would expect damages for
foreign-based conduct on the part of a defendant to fail
step two given the territorial limits because the
infringing acts would need to be within the United
States.3
In contrast, Congress enacted § 271(f) with the
express purpose of creating extraterritorial reach to
United States patent holders. Congress wanted to “to
fill a gap in the enforceability of patent rights,” Life
Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734, 743,
(2017), created by Deepsouth’s embrace of strict
territorial limits to United States patent protection.
By
adopting
§ 271(f),
Congress
expressly
contemplated the regulation of foreign markets,
satisfying step one of RJR Nabisco.

Step two might be satisfied in the situation of trans-border acts
of infringement, where the primary act of infringement, such as
use of the patented invention, arose in the United States. In that
case, the focus of § 271(a) – the use of the invention – arose in the
United States, although certain other acts arose outside of the
United States. Such a scenario can be seen in NTP v. Research
in Motion, where the Federal Circuit concluded there was patent
infringement for the use of the Blackberry® system. In NTP, Inc.
v. Research In Motion, Ltd., part of the infringing system was
located in Canada. 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
abrogated on other grounds by Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672
F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The Federal Circuit nevertheless
concluded that customers used the system within the United
States because “RIM's customers located within the United
States controlled the transmission of the originated information
and also benefited from such an exchange of information.” Id.
Given the focus of the statute – infringing uses within the United
States – a court could conclude that such a scenario satisfies step
two of RJR Nabisco. See Holbrook, Boundaries, supra, at 1780.
3
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Section 271(f) does require some domestic acts for
there to be infringement. Specifically, an infringer
must “suppl[y] or cause[] to be supplied in or from the
United States” either “all or a substantial portion of
the components of a patented invention” or “any
component of a patented invention that is especially
made or especially adapted for use in the invention
and not a staple article or commodity.” 35 U.S.C.
§§ 271(f)(1) & (2). The markets at stake, however, are
not domestic markets. Instead, they are the foreign
markets to where the components are being exported.
Step one of RJR Nabisco, therefore, is satisfied
because Congress spoke to extraterritoriality in the
statute. See Holbrook, Boundaries, supra at 1783.
Technically, consideration of step two of the RJR
Nabisco analysis is not required because step one is
satisfied. Nevertheless, the RJR Nabisco test would
also be satisfied at step two as the focus of the statute
is exportation of components intended to be combined
overseas to create the patented invention, thus
contemplating relief for conduct in foreign markets.
Step two’s consideration of § 271(f)’s “focus,” in
conjunction with § 284’s remedial purpose, further
supports affording damages for extraterritorial acts.
Congress designed the statute to protect patent
owners against the territorial arbitrage present in
Deepsouth.
Consequently, applying the RJR Nabisco
framework here would permit an award of damages
for lost profits in this case because Congress has
demonstrated its intent to permit extraterritorial
reach under § 271(f) and consequently for damages
under § 284 for damages under that provision.
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III. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD ELABORATE
ON WHAT COURTS SHOULD DO AFTER
CONCLUDING EITHER STEP ONE OR STEP TWO
OF RJR NABISCO HAS BEEN SATISFIED.
As presently articulated, the RJR Nabisco test
appears to operate like a light switch – the statute
either has extraterritorial reach or it does not. This
approach is inconsistent with previous articulations of
the presumption, however. For instance, the Court
relied on the presumption in Microsoft Corp. v.
AT & T Corp., to afford a narrow interpretation to
§ 271(f). 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007). The Court used the
presumption to narrowly interpret § 271(f), limiting
the definition of “component” to exclude software in
the abstract and to conclude the defendant had not
supplied a component of the invention. Id. at 451-52,
454.
The Court’s use of the presumption in Microsoft
suggested a subtler, more pervasive role for the
presumption as a means for narrowly interpreting
statutes that have extraterritorial reach. Yet, under
RJR Nabisco, the Court’s analysis would stop at step
one. Today, it is not clear whether the presumption
still operates at the level of statutory interpretation
even once the presumption has been rebutted, as the
Court reasoned in Microsoft.4 The Court should use
This tension was present in Life Technologies Corp. v. Promega
Corp., in which the Court interpreted the § 271(f)(1) language

4

referencing “all or a substantial portion” of the components. 137
S. Ct. 734, 737 (2017). Although the Court ultimately did not
rely on the presumption at all in reaching its decision – indeed
the Court never used the term “presumption” – the tension
between Microsoft and RJR Nabisco was debated during oral
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this case as a vehicle to further elaborate on whether
the presumption still has teeth even after application
of the RJR Nabisco framework. See Gardner, supra
at 135 (noting that the Court in RJR Nabisco “missed
an opportunity to provide much-needed guidance to
judges on how to interpret statutes that rebut the
presumption”).
Two additional considerations should be added to
the RJR Nabisco framework regarding how to
interpret statutes that have rebutted the presumption
or otherwise will permit extraterritorial reach. First,
courts should expressly consider issues of comity and
potential conflicts with foreign law. Second, courts
should take into account territoriality in the damages
context in analyzing proximate cause.
A. Courts Should Expressly Consider Potential
Conflicts with Foreign Law and Other Comity
Concerns When Deciding Whether to Apply a
Statute Extraterritorially.
Given the increasingly global market, issues of
extraterritoriality have come to the fore in patent law.
It is increasingly common for goods to cross various
borders, implicating the patent laws of a variety of
countries. In this regard, RJR Nabisco should not be
read in a manner that is too capacious. Merely
satisfying either step could still result in considerable
extraterritorial reach, risking various conflicts with
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Life
Technologies Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734 (No. 14-

argument.

1538) (Chief Justice noting “once you get over it [the
presumption], you know, it’s over, and then you apply normal
principles.”); see also Holbrook, Boundaries, supra, at 1758-59.
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foreign jurisdictions’ laws, a key consideration
underpinning
the
presumption
against
extraterritoriality.
The Supreme Court should embrace consideration
of comity and potential conflicts of law to balance
against this risk. Such an approach is not unwieldy
nor even unprecedented. Although the Court has
suggested that the “presumption applies regardless of
whether there is a risk of conflict between the
American statute and a foreign law,” Morrison v. Nat'l
Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010), in
practice the Court has considered possible conflicts.
A review of the Supreme Court’s recent cases
applying the presumption demonstrate that the Court
considers this dynamic, even if the Court does not
treat comity as a formal requirement. For example,
in RJR Nabisco itself, the Court noted that “providing
a private civil remedy for foreign conduct creates a
potential for international friction beyond that
presented by merely applying U.S. substantive law to
that foreign conduct.” RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European
Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2106 (2016); see also Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116 (2013)
(recognizing that “the danger of unwarranted judicial
interference in the conduct of foreign policy is
magnified in the context of the ATS, because the
question is not what Congress has done but instead
what courts may do”). In so stating, the Court was
stepping back from the language in Morrison. The
Court noted in RJR Nabisco that, while a conflict “is
not a prerequisite for application of the
presumption…, where such a risk is evident, the need
to enforce the presumption is at its apex.” 136 S. Ct.
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at 2107.

The court emphasized that the mere
potential for a conflict was sufficient. Id. (“It is to say
only that there is a potential for international
controversy that militates against recognizing
foreign-injury claims without clear direction from
Congress.”). The Supreme Court has made clear that
heightened attention to the presumption is
appropriate where a potential conflict with foreign
law exists. As such, it is appropriate for courts to take
comity expressly into account.

The Court specifically embraced the consideration
of potential conflicts in the context of the Lanham Act,
the federal trademark law. In Steele v. Bulova Watch
Co., Inc., the accused infringer was a U.S. citizen
selling counterfeit watches bearing the trademark in
Mexico.
344 U.S. 280, 281 (1952).
The Court
expressly looked to a potential conflict of law – the
ownership of the trademark – in holding that it was
appropriate
to
apply
the
Lanham
Act
extraterritorially. Id. at 289.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
recently considered the extraterritorial reach of the
Lanham Act post-RJR Nabisco and embraced the use
of comity considerations. Specifically, in Trader Joe’s
Co. v. Hallatt, the Ninth Circuit applied seven comity
factors in assessing whether to apply the Lanham Act
extraterritorially:
(1) the degree of conflict with foreign law or
policy, (2) the nationality or allegiance of the
parties and the locations or principal places of
business of corporations, (3) the extent to which
enforcement by either state can be expected to

18
achieve compliance, (4) the relative significance
of effects on the United States as compared
with those elsewhere, (5) the extent to which
there is explicit purpose to harm or affect
American commerce, (6) the foreseeability of
such effect, and (7) the relative importance to
the violations charged of conduct within the
United States as compared with conduct
abroad.
835 F.3d 960, 972-73 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Star–
Kist Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co., 769 F.2d 1393,
1395 (9th Cir. 1985)). The Ninth Circuit’s approach is
consistent with Bulova and demonstrates that there
is space beyond RJR Nabisco for the consideration of
potential conflicts of law in assessing whether
domestic laws should apply extraterritorially.
A similar approach should be used to inform the
extraterritoriality of patent law.
To determine
whether U.S. patent law should apply to
extraterritorial conduct, courts should expressly
consider foreign patent law and various conflicts that
could arise. See Holbrook, Boundaries, supra, at
1788-90; Kumar, supra, at 111-12; Landers, supra, at
45. Consideration of comity provides appropriate
consideration for the sovereignty of foreign countries,
who may have different policies regarding their
patent regimes. Landers, supra, at 39-42 (reviewing
variances in different countries’ patent laws).
Additionally, considering foreign law expressly could
have laudable effects of exchanging ideas and views
on patents. See Holbrook, Extraterritoriality, supra,
at 2186-88. Courts should review potential conflicts
of law if a patent exists in the foreign jurisdiction,
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including ownership, validity, infringement, and
damages. A consideration of comity concerns would
afford a better balance in the application of U.S. law’s
extraterritoriality than the current approach, which
only tacitly acknowledges that concern.
In this case, the lost sales of services arose on the
high seas, suggesting that there is no potential
conflict of law. It may be the case, therefore, that
damages are appropriate in this context. The issue
should be squarely addressed on remand to the
Federal Circuit or the district court.
B. The Court Should Explain Whether the
Presumption
or
Other
Concerns
of
Extraterritoriality Should Inform Proximate
Cause.
The presumption against extraterritoriality
should have reach beyond operating as a lever for
construing statutes with extraterritorial reach. The
presumption could also be used in evaluating
proximate cause for damages, in this case under 35
U.S.C. § 284.
Section 284 is expressly compensatory in nature,
requiring a court to “award the claimant damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement.” The
Federal Circuit has embraced a broad conception of
compensatory damages. In Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley
Co., Inc., the Federal Circuit held that a patentee
could recover lost profits for foregone sales of the
patentee’s product that was not covered by the patent
at issue. 56 F.3d 1538, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
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In so doing, the Federal Circuit eschewed a focus
on the patent claims themselves in favor of an
economic, market-driven approach to compensatory
damages. The court recognized that, to receive
damages, a patent owner must prove both that, but
for the infringement, the patentee would have made
the foregone sale, as well as that the infringement was
the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Id. at
1546. The court noted that proximate cause works to
preclude damages that are too remote, and “the
question of legal compensability is one ‘to be
determined on the facts of each case upon mixed
considerations of logic, common sense, justice, policy
and precedent.’” Id. (quoting 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS
OF LEGAL LIABILITY 110 (1906) (quoted in W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 42, at 279 (5th ed. 1984)). As a result, the
Federal Circuit now focuses on whether the damages
at issue are reasonably foreseeable to a competitor.
Id. It is this purely economic-based approach that the
petitioner and the United States believe should be the
sole limit on damages.
But proximate cause is not so simple. As the
Federal Circuit noted, it is not a singular analysis of
foreseeability; instead, it is complex inquiry that
includes policy and justice, similar to the concerns
that underlie the presumption itself. Proximate cause
should take into account both the remoteness of the
harm from the act generating liability and the
extraterritorial reach of potential application of
damages.
There seems to be some expansion in the concept
of foreseeability in the Federal Circuit’s cases. For
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example, in Carnegie Mellon, the patented invention
was a method. Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell
Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283, 1306–07 (Fed. Cir.
2015). Instead of damages being awarded for the use
of the method, the court permitted the award of a
royalty based on the sales of chips that would execute
the method. Id. As such, the damages are a step
removed from the classic measure of damages for
infringing a patented method, which would be the
value of the use of the method. See Holbrook,
Boundaries, supra at 1791 (criticizing Carnegie
Mellon on proximate cause grounds); see also Mark A.
Lemley, The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree in IP Law,
103 IOWA L. REV. 245, 254–57 (2017) (discussing
issues of causation in patent damages).
Similarly, in the instant case, the damages in
dispute are not for lost profits from the sale of the
patented invention. Instead, they are for “lost profits
resulting from its failure to win foreign service
contracts.” WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical
Corp., 791 F.3d 1340, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert.
granted, judgment vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016),

opinion reinstated WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION
Geophysical Corp., 837 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2016), cert. granted, No. 16-1011, 2018 WL 386561

(U.S. Jan. 12, 2018). The analysis here might be
different if the lost profits sought were foregone sales
of the patented invention. But here, the damages
sought are for a more remote harm. Courts should
consider this remoteness in their proximate cause
analysis.
Relevant, then, to the proximate cause analysis
should be the territorial location of the harm. Just as
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the presumption can be used to inform a court’s
analysis of a statute, even one with extraterritorial
reach, the Court should make clear that territoriality
is also relevant in a proximate cause analysis.
Territorial limits may not provide a bright-line
proscription on all damages arising from activities
outside of the United States, but such limits should
inform how proximate a particular harm is to the
domestic act of infringement.
This dynamic is
particularly important when the damages sought are
already one step removed from an award of lost profits
simply for lost sales of the patented invention.
CONCLUSION
This Court has yet to squarely address whether the
presumption against extraterritoriality applies
separately to remedial provisions in a statute. The
answer to this question is important and transcends
patent law.
The Court should hold that the
presumption does apply separately to remedies, and
that the presumption is rebutted here.
That should not be the end of the inquiry, however.
A court should explicitly consider issues of comity and
conflicts with the law of the implicated foreign
jurisdiction. The Court should reconcile its patent
jurisprudence with that of the Lanham Act and
embrace the formal consideration of conflicts with
foreign law. Such consideration strikes a more
appropriate balance between protecting U.S. patent
owners and respecting the sovereignty of foreign
countries. Here, the infringement took place on the
high seas, seemingly a “patent-free” zone, but this
Court should require confirmation of that fact by the
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district court or court of appeals. Additionally, the
Court
should
ensure
that
concerns
of
extraterritoriality are considered in analyzing the
foreseeability of the infringement damages sought in
this case.
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